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APPLICATIONS OF
THE NEW PARADIGM
The new theory of the firm and the
foundations of modern macro-economics
Of all the market failures, the extended periods
of underutilization of resources-especially human
resources-is of the greatest moment, the conse-
quences of which in turn are exacerbated by capital
market imperfections, which means that even if
future prospects of an unemployed individual are
good, he cannot borrow to sustain his standard of
living.
We referred earlier to the dissatisfaction with tra-
ditional Keynesian explanations, in particular, the
lack of micro-foundations. This gave rise to two
schools of thought. One sought to use the old per-
fect market paradigm, relying heavily on represen-
tative agent models. While information was not per-
fect, expectations were rational. But the
representative agent model, by construction, ruled
out the information asymmetries which are at the
heart of macro-economic problems. Only if an indi-
vidual has a severe case of schizophrenia is it pos-
sible for such problems to arise. If one begins with
a model that assumes that markets clear, it is hard to
see how one can get much insight into unemploy-
ment (the failure of the labor market to clear).
The construction of a macro-economic model
which embraces the consequences of imperfections
of information in labor, product, and capital mar-
kets has become one of my major preoccupations
over the past fifteen years. Given the complexity of
each of these markets, creating a general equilibri-
um model-simple enough to be taught to graduate
students or used by policy makers-has not proven
to be an easy task. At the heart of that model lies a
new theory of the firm, for which the theory of
asymmetric information provides the foundations.
The modem theory of the finn in turn rests on three
pillars, the theory of corporate finance, the theory
of corporate governance, and the theory of organi-
zational design.
The theory of corporate finance
Under the older, perfect information theory, it
made no difference whether firms raised capital by
debt or equity, in the absence of tax distortions.' 02
This was the central insight of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem.' 03 We have noted how the willing-
ness to hold (or to sell) shares conveys information,
so that how firms raise capital does make a differ-
ence.l"M Finns rely heavily on debt finance, and
bankruptcy, resulting from the failure to meet debt
obligations, matters. Both because of the cost of
bankruptcies and limitations in the design of man-
agerial incentive schemes,'05 finms typically act in a
risk averse manner' 0 '-with risk being more than
just a correlation with the business cycle. 107
Moreover, with credit rationing (or the potential
of credit rationing) not only does the firm's net
worth (the market value of its assets) matter, but so
does its asset structure, including its liquidity. 08
While there are many implications of the theory of
the risk averse finn facing credit rationing, some of
which are elaborated upon in the next section, one
example should suffice to highlight the importance
of these ideas. In traditional neoclassical invest-
ment theory, investment depends on the real interest
rate, and the finn's perception of expected returns.
The firm's cash flow or its net worth should make
no difference. The earliest econometric studies of
investment, by Kuh and Meyer [1957], suggested
that that was not the case. But under the strength of
the theoretical strictures that these variables could
not matter, they were excluded from econometric
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analysis for two decades following the work of Hall
and Jorgenson [1967]. It was not until work on
asymmetric information had restored theoretical
respectability to introducing such variables in
investment regressions that it was acceptable to do
so; and when that was done, it was shown that,
especially for small and medium sized enterprises,
these variables were crucial.'09
Moreover, in the traditional theory, there is no
corporate veil; individuals can see perfectly what is
going on inside the firm; it makes no difference
whether the firm distributes or retains its profits
(other than for taxes).110 But if there is imperfect
information about what is going on inside the firm,
then there is a corporate veil, which cannot be eas-
ily pierced.
Corporate governance
In the traditional theory, firms simply maximized
the expected present discounted value of profits
(which equaled market value)"' and with perfect
information, how that was to be done was simply an
engineering problem. Disagreements about what
the firm should do were of little importance. In that
context, corporate governance-how firn decisions
were made-mattered little as well. But again, in
reality, corporate governance matters a great deal.
There are disagreements about what the finn should
do"12-partly motivated by differences in judg-
ments, partly motivated by differences in objec-
tives. Managers can take actions which advance
their interests at the expense of that of shareholders,
and majority shareholders can advance their inter-
ests at the expense of minority shareholders. The
owners (who, in the language of Steve Ross [1973]
came to be called the principal) not only could not
monitor their workers and managers (the agents),
because of asymmetries of information, but also
they typically did not even know what these people
who were supposed to be acting on their behalf
should do. That there were important consequences
for the theory of the firm of the separation of own-
ership and control had earlier been noted by Berle
and Means [1932],113 but it was not until informa-
tion economics that we had a coherent way of think-
ing about the implications.
The problem of corporate governance, of course,
arises both from the problems of information
imperfections and the public good nature of man-
agement/oversight: if a shareholder engages in
expenditures on oversight, and succeeds in improv-
ing the firm's performance, all shareholders benefit
equally (similarly with creditors.) (See Stiglitz
[1985b]).
Some who still held to the view that firms would
maximize their market value argued that take-overs
(and the threat of take-overs) would ensure that
competition in the market for managers would
ensure stock market value maximization. (If the
firm were not maximizing its stock market value,
then it would pay someone to buy the firm, and
change its actions so that its value would increase.)
Early on in this debate, I raised questions on theo-
retical grounds about the efficacy of the take-over
mechanism (See Stiglitz [1972b]). The most force-
ful set of arguments were subsequently put forward
by Grossman and Hart [1980], who observed that
any small shareholder who believed that the
takeover would subsequently increase the market
value would not be willing to sell his shares. Only
take-overs that were expected to be value decreas-
ing would be successful."4 The subsequent work by
Edlin and Stiglitz [1995], referred to earlier,
showed how existing managers could take actions
to reduce the effectiveness of competition for man-
agement, i.e. the threat of take-overs, by increasing
asymmetries of information.
(Proving that a firm does not maximize their
stock market value is, of course, difficult, since it is
hard to ascertain its opportunity set and the conse-
quences of alternative actions. However, there are a
large number of instances in which it is clear that
firms do not maximize market value. For instance,
closed end mutual funds regularly sell at a discount;
there would be a simple action-dissolution of the
firm-which would increase market value. There
are a large number of tax paradoxes, (see, e.g.
Stiglitz [1973b, 1982d])-actions which firms
could take that would reduce the total tax bill (cor-
porate plus individual), though there remains some
dispute about the extent to which such paradoxes
are due to irrationality on the part of investors or
non-value maximizing behavior on the part of man-
agers.)
Organizational design
So far, we have discussed two of the three pillars
of the modern theory of the firm: corporate finance
and corporate governance. The third is organiza-
tional design. In a world with perfect information,
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organizational design too is of little moment. In
practice, it is of central concern to businesses. We
have already extensively discussed the issue of
incentives, how, on the one hand, information
imperfections limit the extent of efficient decentral-
izability and how, on the other, organizational
design-by having alternative units perform com-
parable tasks-can enable a firm to glean informa-
tion on the basis of which better incentive systems
can be based. (Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983a, b]).
But there is another important aspect of organi-
zational design. Even if individuals are well inten-
tioned, with limited information, mistakes get
made. To err is human. Raaj Sah and I, in a series of
papers [1985, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1991] explored
the consequences of alternative organizational
design and decision making structures for organiza-
tional mistakes, for instance, where good projects
get rejected or bad projects get accepted. We sug-
gested that in a variety of circumstances, especially
when there is a scarcity of good projects, decentral-
ized polyarchical organizational structures have
distinct advantages." 5
Macro-economics
The central macro-economic issue is that of
unemployment. The models I described earlier
explained why there could exist unemployment in
equilibrium. But much of macro-economics is con-
cerned with dynamics, with fluctuations, with
explaining why sometimes the economy, rather than
absorbing shocks, seems to amplify them, and why
their effects often persist. In joint work with Bruce
Greenwald and Andy Weiss, we have shown how
the theories of asymmetric information can help
provide explanations of these macro-economic phe-
nomena. The imperfections of capital markets-the
phenomena of credit and equity rationing which
arise because of information asymmetries-are key.
They lead to risk averse behavior of firms and to
households and firms being affected by cash flow
constraints.
Standard interpretations of Keynesian econom-
ics emphasized the importance of wage and price
rigidities, but without a convincing explanation of
those rigidities. For instance, some theories had
stressed the importance of costs of adjustment of
prices,"6 but what was at issue was why markets
seemed to adjust quantities rather than prices, and
the relative costs of adjustment of quantities
seemed greater than those of prices. The Green-
wald- Stiglitz theory of adjustment [1989b] provid-
ed an explanation based on capital market'"7 imper-
fections arising from information imperfections: it
argued that, at least for commodities for which
inventory costs were reasonably low, the risks aris-
ing from informational imperfections were greater
for price and wage adjustments than from quantity
adjustments. Risk averse firms would make smaller
adjustments to variables, the consequences of
which were more uncertain.
But even though wages and prices were not per-
fectly flexible, neither were they perfectly rigid,
and indeed in the Great Depression, they fell by a
considerable amount. There had been large fluctua-
tions in earlier periods, and in other countries, in
which there had been a high degree of wage and
price flexibility. Greenwald and I [1987a, 1987b,
1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1988e, 1989b, 1990b, 1993a,
1993b, 1995] argued that it was other market fail-
ures, in particular, the imperfections of capital mar-
kets and the incomplete contracting which provided
part of the explanation for key observed macro-eco-
nomic phenomena. In debt contracts, typically not
indexed for changes in prices, whenever prices fell
below the level expected (or in variable interest rate
contracts, when real interest rates rose above the
level expected) there were transfers from debtors to
creditors. In these circumstances, excessive down-
ward price flexibility (not just price rigidities) could
give rise to problems."' These (and other) redistrib-
utive changes had large real effects, and could not
be insured against because of imperfections in cap-
ital markets. Large shocks could lead to bankruptcy,
and with bankruptcy (especially when it results in
firm liquidation) there was a loss of organizational
and informational capital."' Even if such large
changes could be forestalled, until there was a res-
olution, the firm's access to credit would be
impaired, and for good reason; moreover, without
"clear owners" those in control would in general
not have incentives to maximize the firm's value.
Even when the shocks were not large enough to
lead to bankruptcy, they had impacts on firns' abil-
ity and willingness to take risks. Since all produc-
tion is risky, shocks affect aggregate supply, as well
as the demand for investment. Because firm's net
worth would only be restored over time, the effects
of a shock persisted. By the same token, there were
hysteresis effects associated with policy: an
increase in interest rates which depleted firm net
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worth had impacts even after the interest rates were
reduced. If fimns were credit rationed, then reduc-
tions in liquidity could have particularly marked
effects."20 Every aspect of macro-economic behav-
ior was affected: the theories helped explain, for
instance, the seemingly anomalous behavior of
inventories (rather than using inventories to smooth
production, which would result in countercyclical
changes in inventories, inventories moved pro-
cyclically, because of the importance of cash con-
straints, leading to a high shadow price of money in
recessions) and pricing (with the "shadow price" of
capital being high in a recession, firms did not
invest as much in acquiring new customers and
were less concerned about losing workers, so that
mark-ups increased, so that real product wages
could fall, even though the marginal productivity of
labor was rising.)
In short, our analysis emphasized the supply side
effects of shocks, the interrelationships between
supply and demand side effects, and the importance
of finance in propagating fluctuations.
Theory of money'2 '
A particularly important aspect of our reformula-
tion of macro-economics is the focus on monetary
economics. Traditionally, it was postulated that the
interest rate was set to equate the demand and sup-
ply for money, with money being largely required
for transactions purposes, and with the interest rate
representing the opportunity cost of money. In mod-
em economies, however, credit, not money, is
required (and used) for most transactions, and most
transactions are simply exchanges of assets, and
therefore not directly related to DP. Moreover,
today, most money is interest bearing, with the dif-
ference between the interest rate paid, say on a
money market account and T bill rates having little
to do with monetary policy, and related solely to
transactions costs. What is important is the avail-
ability of credit (and the terms at which it is avail-
able); this in turn is related to the certification of
credit worthiness by banks and other institutions. In
short, information is at the heart of monetary eco-
nomics. But banks are like other risk averse firms:
their ability and willingness to bear the risks asso-
ciated with making loans depends on their net
worth."X Because of equity rationing, shocks to
their net worth cannot be instantaneously undone,
and the theory thus explains why such shocks can
have large adverse macro-economic consequences.
The theory shows how not only traditional mone-
tary instruments (like reserve requirements) but
regulatory instruments (like risk adjusted capital
adequacy requirements) can be used to affect the
supply of credit, interest rates charged, and the
bank's risk portfolio. The analysis also showed how
excessive reliance on capital adequacy require-
ments could be counterproductive."23
The theory has important policy implications. It
provides a new basis for a "liquidity trap," explain-
ing why in severe economic downturns, monetary
policy may be relatively ineffective. It explains
some of the recent policy failures, both in the
inability of the Fed to forestall the 1991 recession
and the failures of the IMF in East Asia in 1997. It
shifts emphasis from looking at the Fed Funds rate,
or the money supply, to variables of more direct rel-
evance to economic activity, the level of credit,"'
and the interest rates charged to firms (and it
explains the movement in the spread between that
rate and the Federal Funds rate). The theory pre-
dicts that there is scope for monetary policy even in
the presence of dollarization.'1
We also analyzed the importance of credit inter-
linkages. Many firms receive credit from other
firns, at the same time that they provide credit to
still others (violating Polonius' injunction "neither a
lender nor a borrower be" by being both.) The dis-
perse nature of information in the economy pro-
vides an explanation of this phenomena, which has
important consequences. As a result of these gener-
al interlinkages (in some ways, every bit as impor-
tant as the commodity interlinkages stressed in
standard general equilibrium analysis) a shock to
one firmn gets transmitted to others, and when there
is a large enough shock, there can be a cascade of
bankruptcies.
Growth'26 and development12 7
While most of the macro-economic analysis
focused on exploring the implications of imperfec-
tions of credit markets arising out of information
problems for cyclical variations, another strand of
our research program focused on growth. The
importance of capital markets for growth had long
been recognized; without capital markets firms
have to rely on retained earnings. But how firms
raise capital is important for growth. In particular,
"equity rationing"--especially important in devel-
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oping countries, where informational problems are
even greater-impedes firms' willingness to invest
and undertake risks, and thus slows down growth.
Changes in economic policy which enable firms to
bear more risk (e.g. by reducing the size of macro-
economic fluctuations, or which enhance firms'
equity base, by suppressing interest rates, which
result in firm's having larger profits) enhance eco-
nomic growth. Conversely, policies, such as associ-
ated with IMF interventions, in which interest rates
are raised to very high levels, discourage the use of
debt, forcing finns to rely more heavily on retained
earnings.
The most challenging problems for growth lie in
economic development. Typically, market failures
are more prevalent in less developed countries, and
these market failures are often associated with
information problems-the very problems that
inspired much of the research described in this
paper. While these perspectives help explain the
failures of policies based on assuming perfect or
well functioning markets, they also direct attention
to policies which might remedy or reduce the con-
sequences of informational imperfections. 28
Research
One of the most important determinants of the
pace of growth is, for developed countries, the
investment in research, and for less developed
countries, efforts at closing the knowledge gap
between themselves and more developed countries.
Knowledge is, of course, a particularform of infor-
mation, and many of the issues that are central to
the economics of information are also key to under-
standing research-such as the problems of appro-
priability, the fixed costs associated with invest-
ments in research, which give rise to imperfections
in competition, and the public good nature of infor-
mation. It was thus natural that I turned to explore
the implications in a series of papers that looked at
both industry equilibrium and the consequences for
economic growth.'29 While it is not possible to sum-
marize briefly the results, two conclusions do stand
out: that market economies in which research and
innovation play an important role are not well
described by the standard competitive model, and
that the market equilibrium, without government
intervention, is not, in general, efficient.
POLICY FRAMEWORKS
The fact that when there are asymmetries of
information, markets are not, in general, con-
strained Pareto efficient implies that there is a
potentially important role for government. The new
paradigm has important implications for policy,
going well beyond addressing how to prevent the
creation of asymmetries of information and how to
overcome them. As we have seen, asymmetries of
information give rise to a host of other market fail-
ures-such as missing markets, and especially cap-
ital market imperfections, leading to firms that are
risk averse and cash constrained-and policy has to
deal with these indirect consequences as well. An
analysis, for instance, of the incidence of taxation
which is predicated on perfectly competitive mar-
kets with perfectly informed consumers and risk
neutral firms, is likely to go astray.
But beyond this, the new information paradigm
helps us to think about policy from a new perspec-
tive, one which recognizes the pervasiveness of
imperfections of information.
Pareto efficient taxationl30
Information asymmetries, of course, arise among
all participants in society-including between citi-
zens and their government. In the final section of
this paper, I wish to explore one side: the difficul-
ties citizens have of controlling their government.
Here, I want to briefly note the other side: the prob-
lems posed to government in the conduct of its
"business" that arise from information asymme-
tries, in three key areas, taxation, regulation, and
production.
One of the functions of government is to redis-
tribute income; even if it did not wish to redistrib-
ute actively, it has to raise revenues to finance pub-
lic goods, and there is a concern that the revenue be
raised in an equitable manner, e.g. that those who
are more able to contribute (or who benefit more)
do so. But government has a problem of identifying
these individuals. Just as those who a monopolist
would like to charge more do not readily disclose
that they might be willing to pay more for the prod-
uct, and just as those who are less able, less likely
to pay back a loan, or more likely to have an acci-
dent do not readily disclose that information to
those with whom they deal, so too in the public sec-
tor. And the self-selection mechanisms for informa-
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tion revelation that Rothschild and I had explored in
our competitive insurance model or that I had
explored in my paper on discriminating monopoly
can be used here. (The problem of the government,
maximizing social "profit" (welfare) subject to the
information constraints, is closely analogous to that
of the monopolist, maximizing private profit sub-
ject to information constraints. This is why Mirr-
lees' [1971] paper on optimal taxation, though not
couched in information-theoretic terms, was an
important precursor to the work described here.)
The critical question for the design of a tax sys-
tem thus becomes what is observable. In older the-
ories, in which information was perfect, lump sum
taxes and redistributions made sense. If ability is
not directly observable, the government had to rely
on other observables-like income-to make infer-
ences; but, as in all such models, marlcet partici-
pants, as they recognize that inferences are being
made, alter their behavior. In Mirrlees [1971] only
income was observable. But in different circum-
stances, either more or less information might be
available. It might be possible to observe hours
worked, in which case wages would be observable.
It might be possible to observe the quantity of each
good purchased by any particular individual or it
might be possible to observe only the aggregate
quantity of goods produced.
For each information structure, there is a Pareto
efficient tax structure, that is, a tax structure such
that no one (group) can be made better off without
making some other group worse off. The choice
among such tax structures depends on the social
welfare function (attitudes towards inequality.)"3 '
While this is not the occasion to provide a complete
description of the results, two are worth noting:
what had been thought of as optimal commodity tax
structures (Ramsey [1927]) were shown to be part
of a Pareto efficient tax system only under highly
restricted conditions, e.g. that there was no income
tax (see also Sah and Stiglitz [1992]). On the other
hand, it was shown that in a central benchmark
case, it was not optinal to tax interest income.
Theory of regulation and privatization
The government faced the same problem posed
by information asymmetries in regulation that it
faced in taxation. Over the past quarter century, a
huge literature has developed making use of self-
selection mechanisms,'32 allowing far better and
more effective systems of regulation than had exist-
ed in the past."33
In the 1980s, there was a strong movement
towards privatizing state enterprises, even in areas
in which there was a natural monopoly, in which
case government ownership would be replaced with
government regulation. While it was apparent that
frequently there were problems with government
ownership, the theories of imperfect information
also made it clear that even the best designed regu-
latory systems would work imperfectly. This raised
naturally the question of under what circumstances
could we be sure that privatization would enhance
economic welfare. As Herbert Simon [1991], the
1978 Nobel Prize winner, had earlier emphasized,
both public and private sectors face information and
incentive problems; there was no compelling theo-
retical argument for why large private organizations
would solve these incentive problems better. In
work with David Sappington [1987b] we showed
that the conditions under which privatization would
necessarily be welfare enhancing were extremely
restrictive, and closely akin to those under which
competitive markets would yield Pareto efficient
outcomes. (See Stiglitz [1993d, 1994c] for an elab-
oration and applications.)
KEY POLICY DEBATES: APPLYING
BASIC IDEAS
The perspectives provided by the new informa-
tion paradigm not only shaped theoretical
approaches to policy, but in innumerable concrete
issues also led to markedly different policy stances
from those wedded to the old paradigm.
Development and the Washington consensus
Perhaps the most noted were the controversies
concerning development strategies, where the
Washington consensus policies, based on market
fundamentalism-the simplistic view of competi-
tive markets with perfect infonnation, inappropriate
even for developed countries, but particularly inap-
propriate for developing countries-had prevailed
since the early 1980s within the international eco-
nomic institutions. Elsewhere, I have documented
the failures of these policies in development,' 34 as
well as in managing the transition from Commu-
nism to a market economy'35 and in managing
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crises. Ideas matters, and it is not surprising that
policies based on models that depart as far from
reality as those underlying the Washington Consen-
sus so often led to failure.
Bankruptcy, aggregate supply, and the East
Asia crisis
This point was brought home perhaps most
forcefully by the management of the East Asia cri-
sis which began in Thailand on July 2, 1997. While
I have written extensively on the many dimensions
of the failed responses,'36 here I want to note the
close link between these failures and the theories
put forward here. Our work had emphasized the
importance of maintaining the credit supply and the
risks of (especially poorly managed) bankruptcy.
Poorly designed policies could lead to an unneces-
sarily large reduction in credit availability and
unnecessary large increases in bankruptcy, both
leading to large adverse effects on aggregate supply,
exacerbating the economic downturn. But this is
precisely what the IMF did: by raising interest rates
to extremely high levels in countries where fimns
were already highly leveraged, it forced massive
bankruptcy, and the economies were thus plunged
into deep recession and depression; capital was not
attracted to the country, but rather fled. Thus, the
policies even failed in their stated purpose, which
was to stabilize the exchange rate. There were
strong hysteresis effects associated with these poli-
cies: when the interest rates were subsequently low-
ered, the firms that had been forced into bankrupt-
cy did not become unbankrupt, and the firms that
had seen their net worth depleted did not see an
immediate restoration. There were alternative poli-
cies available, debt standstills followed by corpo-
rate financial restructurings, which, while they
might not have avoided a downturn, would have
resulted in the downturns being shallower and
shorter. Malaysia, whose economic policies con-
formed much more closely to those that our theories
would have suggested, not only recovered more
quickly, but was left with less of a legacy of debt to
impair its future growth, than did neighboring Thai-
land, which conformed more closely to the IMF's
recommendation.
Corporate governance, open capital
markets, and the transition to a market
economy
The transition from communism to a market
economy represents one of the most important eco-
nomic experiments of all time, and the failure (so
far) in Russia, and the successes in China, shed con-
siderable light on many of the issues which I have
been discussing. The full dimension of Russia's
failure is hard to fathom. Communism, with its cen-
tral planning (requiring more information gather-
ing, processing, and dissemination capacity than
could be managed with any technology), its lack of
incentives, and its system rife with distortions, was
viewed as highly inefficient. The movement to a
market, it was assumed, would bring enormous
increases in incomes. Instead, incomes plummeted,
a decline confirmed not only by GDP statistics and
household surveys, but also by social indicators.
The numbers in poverty soared, from 2% to
upwards of 50% (depending on the measure used).
While there were many dimensions to these fail-
ures, one stands out: the privatization strategy,
which paid little attention to the issues of corporate
governance which we stressed earlier. Empirical
work confirms'37 that countries that privatized
rapidly but lacked "good" corporate governance did
not grow more rapidly. As Sappington and my
paper warned, privatization might not lead to an
increase in social welfare; rather than providing a




We have seen how the competitive paradigm that
dominated economic thinking for two centuries not
only was not robust, not only did not explain key
economic phenomena, but also led to misguided
policy prescriptions.
My research over the past thirty years has
focused, however, on only one aspect of my dissat-
isfaction with that paradigm. It is not easy to change
views of the world, and it seemed to me the most
effective way of attacking the paradigm was to keep
within the standard framework as much as possible.
I only varied one assumption-the assumption con-
cerning perfect information-and in ways which
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seemed highly plausible. Early on, some objected
that opening up the model to the possibilities of
imperfect information was opening up a Pandora's
box: there were so many ways in which information
could be imperfect. But while there might be only
one way in which information was perfect, surely it
was better to understand the consequences of dif-
ferent forms of information imperfections that
might exist in the real world. If the competitive
model was not robust against all these different
forms of information imperfections which existed
in the world, surely it was not a model upon which
we could rely. As time evolved, it became clear that
the imperfect information paradigm itself was high-
ly robust; there were some quite general principles,
while the working out of the models in detail in dif-
ferent situations might well differ. We succeeded in
showing not only that the standard theory was not
robust-changing only one assumption in ways
which were totally plausible had drastic conse-
quences-but also that an alternative robust para-
digm with great explanatory power could be con-
structed.
There were other deficiencies in the theory, some
of which were closely connected. The standard the-
ory assumed that technology and preferences were
fixed. But changes in technology, R & D, are at the
heart of capitalism. The new information econom-
ics-extended to incorporate changes in knowl-
edge-at last began to address systematically these
foundations of a market economy.
As I thought about the problems of development,
I similarly became increasingly convinced of the
inappropriateness of the assumption of fixed prefer-
ences.' 39 I have criticized the Washington consensus
development strategies partly on the grounds that
they perceived development as nothing more than
increasing the stock of capital and reducing eco-
nomic distortions. But development represents a far
more fundamental transformation of society,
including a change in "preferences" and attitudes,
an acceptance of change and an abandonment of
many traditional ways of thinking.'40
Especially during the last few years, as I have
become more deeply immersed in the problems of
development, I have felt more strongly these and
some of the other deficiencies of the standard para-
digm, for instance, its attempt to separate out eco-
nomics from broader social concerns. A major
impediment to development in Africa has been the
civil strife which has been endemic there, itself in
part a consequence of the economic circum-
stances.141
These perspectives have strong policy implica-
tions. For instance, some policies are more con-
ducive to effecting a development transformation.
Many of the policies of the IMF-including the
manner in which it interacted with governments,
basing loans on conditionality-were counterpro-
ductive. A fundamental change in development
strategy occurred at the World Bank in the years I
was there, one which embraced this more compre-
hensive approach to development. By contrast,
policies which have ignored social consequences
have frequently been disastrous. The IMF policies
in Indonesia, including the elimination of food and
fuel subsidies for the very poor, just as the country
was plunging into depression, with wages plum-
meting and unemployment soaring, predictably led
to riots; the economic consequences are still being
felt.
In some ways, as I pursued these perspectives, I
was returning to a theme I had raised thirty years
ago, during my work on the efficiency wage theory
in Kenya,"42 where I had suggested how psycholog-
ical factors-morale, reflecting a sense that one is
receiving a fair wage-could affect efforts, an alter-
native, and in some cases more persuasive reason
for the efficiency wage theory, that has subsequent-
ly been developed further by Akerlof and Yellen
[1990]. It is curious how economists have almost
studiously ignored factors, which are not only the
center of day to day life, but even of business
school education. Surely, if markets were efficient,
such attention would not be given to such matters,
to issues of corporate culture and extrinsic rewards,
unless they were of some considerable impor-
tance.'4 ' And if such issues are of importance within
a fimn, they are equally important within a society.
Finally, I have become convinced that the
dynamics of change may not be well described by
equilibrium models that have long been at the cen-
ter of economic analysis. Information economics
has alerted us to the fact that history matters; there
are important hysteresis effects. Random events-
the black plague-have consequences that are irre-
versible. Dynamics may be better described by evo-
lutionary processes and models, than by
equilibrium processes. And while it may be difficult
to describe fully these evolutionary processes, this
much is already clear: there is no reason to believe
that they are, in any general sense, "optimal."'"
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Many of the same themes that emerged from our
simpler work in information economics applied
here. For instance, repeatedly, in the information
theoretic models discussed above we showed that
multiple equilibria (some of which Pareto dominat-
ed others) could easily arise. The same is true in my
paper (Stiglitz, [1995b]). This in turn has several
important consequences, beyond the observation
already made that history matters. First, it means
that one cannot simply predict where the economy
will be by knowing preferences and technology
(and initial endowments). There can be a high level
of indeterminacy. Secondly, as in Darwinian eco-
logical models, the major determinant of one's
environment is the behavior of others, and their
behavior may in turn depend on their beliefs about
others' behavior. (Hoff and Stiglitz [2000]). As Dar-
win noted after his visit to the Galapagos islands:
The plants and animals of the Galapagos dif-
fer radically among islands that [have] the
same geological nature, the same height, cli-
mate, etc.... This long appeared to me a great
difficulty, but it arises in chief part from the
deeply seated error of considering the physi-
cal conditions of a country as the most impor-
tant for its inhabitants; whereas it cannot, I
think he disputed that the nature of the other
inhabitants, with which each has to compete,
is at least as important, and generally a far
more important element of success. (Darwin
[1959] 1993: 540)
Thirdly, government intervention can sometimes
move the economy from one equilibrium to anoth-
er; and having done that, continued intervention
might not be required.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INFORMATION
Information imperfections, and asymmetries of
information, are pervasive in every aspect of life
and society. Here, I want to talk about three of the
ways in which information affects political process-
es.
First, we have already noted the distributive con-
sequences of infornation disclosures. Not surpris-
ingly, then, the "information rules of the game,"
both for the economy and for political processes,
can become a subject of intense political debate.
The United States and the IMF argued strongly that
lack of transparency was at the root of the 1997
financial crisis, and said that the East Asian coun-
tries had to become more transparent. The recogni-
tion that quantitative data concerning capital flows
(outstanding loans) by the IMF and the US Treasury
could have been taken as a concession of the inap-
propriateness of the competitive paradigm (in
which prices convey all the relevant information);
but the more appropriate way of viewing the debate
was political, a point which became clear when it
was noted that partial disclosures could be of only
limited value, and could possibly be counterproduc-
tive, as capital would be induced to move through
channels involving less disclosure, channels like off
shore banking centers which were also less well
regulated. When demands for transparency thus
went beyond East Asia to Western hedge funds and
off shore banking centers, suddenly the advocates
of more transparency became less enthralled, and
began praising the advantages of partial secrecy in
enhancing incentives to gather information. The
United States and the US Treasury then opposed the
OECD initiative to combat money laundering
through greater transparency of off shore banking
centers-these institutions served particular politi-
cal and economic interests-until it became clear
that terrorists might be using them to'help finance
their operations; at that point, the balance of Amer-
ican interests changed, and the US Treasury
changed its position.
Political processes inevitably entail asymmetries
of information: our political leaders are supposed to
know more about threats to defense, about our eco-
nomic situation, etc., than ordinary citizens. There
has been a delegation of responsibility for day-to-
day decision making, just as there is within a finn.
The problem is to provide incentives for those so
entrusted to act on behalf of those who they are sup-
posed to be serving-the standard principle agent
problem. Democracy-contestability in political
processes-provides a check on abuses of the pow-
ers that come from delegation just as it does in eco-
nomic processes; but just as we recognize that the
take-over mechanism provides an imperfect check,
so too we should recognize that the electoral
process provides an imperfect check. Just as we rec-
ognize that current management has an incentive to
increase asymmetries of information in order to
enhance its market power, increase its discretion, so
too in public life. And just as we recognize that dis-
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closure requirements-greater transparency-and
specific rules of the game (e.g. related to corporate
governance) can affect the effectiveness of the take-
over mechanism and the overall quality of corpo-
rate governance, so too the same factors can affect
political contestability and the quality of public
governance. (Stiglitz [2001f].)
In the context of political processes, where
"exit" options are limited, one needs to be particu-
larly concerned about abuses. If a firm is misman-
aged-if the managers attempt to enrich themselves
at the expense of shareholders and customers and
entrench themselves against competition-the dam-
age is limited: customers at least can switch. But in
political processes, those who see the quality of
public services deteriorate cannot do so as easily. If
all individuals were as mean spirited and selfish as
economists have traditionally modeled them, mat-
ters would indeed be bleak: as I have put it else-
where, ensuring the public good (public manage-
ment) is itself a public good. But there is a wealth
of evidence that the economists' traditional model
of the individual is too narrow-and that indeed
intrinsic rewards, e.g. of public service, can be even
more effective than extrinsic rewards, e.g. monetary
compensation (which is not to say that compensa-
tion is not of some importance). This public spirit-
edness (even if blended with a modicum of self-
interest) is manifested in a variety of civil society
organizations, through which voluntarily individu-
als work collectively to advance their perception of
the collective interests.
There are strong forces on the part of those in
government to reduce transparency. More trans-
parency reduces their scope for action-it not only
exposes mistakes, but also corruption (as the
expression goes, sunshine is the strongest antisep-
tic). Government officials may try to enhance their
power, by trying to advance specious arguments for
secrecy,' 45 and then saying, in effect, to justify their
otherwise inexplicable or self-serving behavior,
"trust me ... if you only knew what I knew."
There is a further rationale for secrecy: secrecy is
an artificially created scarcity of information, and
like most artificially created scarcities, it gives rise
to rents, rents which in some countries are appro-
priated through outright corruption (selling infor-
mation), but in others are part of a "gift exchange"
in which reporters not only provide puff pieces
praising the government official who has given the
reporter privileged access to information, particu-
larly in ways which are designed to enhance the
officials influence and power, but distort news cov-
erage. I was in the unfortunate position of watching
closely this process work, and work quite effective-
ly. Without unbiased information, the effectiveness
of the check that can be provided by the citizenry is
limited; without good information, the contestabili-
ty of the political processes can be undermined.
One of the lessons of the economics of informa-
tion is that these problems cannot be fully resolved,
but there are laws and institutions which can decid-
edly improve matters. Right-to-know laws,
demanding transparency, have been part of gover-
nance in Sweden for two hundred years; they have
become an important if imperfect check on govern-
ment abuses in the United States over the past quar-
ter century. In the last five years, there has become
a growing international movement, with some
countries, such as Thailand, going so far as to
include them in their new Constitution. Regrettably,
these principles have yet to be endorsed by the
international economic institutions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have traced the replacement of one
paradigm with another. The deficiencies in the neo-
classical paradigm-both the predictions which
seemed counter to what was observed, some so
glaring that one hardly needed refined econometric
testing, and the phenomena that were left unex-
plained-made it inevitable that it was simply a
matter of time before it became challenged. One
might ask, how can we explain the persistence of
the paradigm for so long? Partly, it must be because,
in spite of its deficiencies, it did provide insights
into many economic phenomena. There are some
markets in which the phenomena which we have
discussed are not important-the market for wheat
or corn-though even here, pervasive government
interventions make the reining competitive para-
digm of limited relevance. The underlying forces of
demand and supply are still important, though in the
new paradigm, they become only part of the analy-
sis; they are not the whole analysis. But one cannot
ignore the possibility that the survival of the para-
digm was partly because the belief in that paradigm,
and the policy prescriptions, has served certain
interests.
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As a social scientist, I have tried to follow the
analysis, wherever it might lead. As any researcher,
we know that our ideas can be used or abused-or
ignored. Understanding the complex forces that
shape our economy is of value in its own right;
there is an innate curiosity about how this system
works. But "All the world's a stage, and all the men
and women merely players" Shakespeare [1599].
Each of us in our own way, if only as voters, is an
actor in this grand drama. And what we do is affect-
ed by our perceptions of how this complex system
works.
I entered economics with the hope that it might
enable me to do something about unemployment,
poverty, and discrimination. As an economic
researcher, I have been lucky enough to hit upon
some ideas that I think do enhance our understand-
ing of these phenomena. As an educator, I have
been lucky enough to have had the opportunity to
reduce some of the asymmetries of information,
especially concerning what the new information
paradigm and other developments in modem eco-
nomic science have to say about these phenomena,
and to have had some first rate students who them-
selves have pushed the research agenda forward.
As an individual, I have, however, not been con-
tent just to let others translate these ideas into prac-
tice. I have had the good fortune to be able to do so
myself, as a public servant both in the American
government and at the World Bank. We have the
good fortune to live in democracies, in which indi-
viduals can fight for their perception of what a bet-
ter world might be like. We as academics have the
good fortune to be further protected by our acade-
mic freedom. With freedom comes responsibility:
the responsibility to use that freedom to do what we
can to ensure that the world of the future be one in
which there is not only greater economic prosperi-
ty, but also more social justice.
© The Nobel Foundation
Notes
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103.See Modigliani and Miller [1958]. They won
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106.See, in particular, Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1991].
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[1987c, 1989g].
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and Hubbard [1990] and Fazzari, Hubbard and
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tions which arose from imperfect information.
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Stiglitz [1972a, 1982b], Newbery and Stiglitz
[1982], Grossman and Stiglitz [1977, 1980b].
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persuaded that there is scope for a Pareto
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mation (knowledge), this may be hard to do.
See Stiglitz [1992c].
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Stiglitz [1999d] emphasizes the consequences
of difference in the speeds of adjustments of
different prices.
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made decisions) did not matter, and so the
change in control that was consequent to bank-
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with perfect information, there would be little
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than extending funds through equity (especial-
ly if there were significant probabilities of, and
costs to, bankruptcy). For an insightful discus-
sion about control rights see Hart [1995].
120.For discussions of credit rationing and macro-
economic activity, see Stiglitz and Weiss
[1992].
121.The ideas set forth in this section are developed
at greater length in Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1990b, 1991, 2003].
122.The special nature of information also helps
explain the link between the acquisition and
processing of information and the provision of
funds. If information were like any other good,
"information" firms could sell their informa-
tion to providers of funds, so that shocks which
adversely affect the net worth of the informa-
tion processors would have minimal effects on
credit supply. While there is some sale of infor-
mation, in most lending markets, such informa-
tion constitutes only a small part of the infor-
mation that affects lending decisions.
123.See also Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz
[2000].
124.There is now a large literature arguing that
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an early discussion, see Blinder and Stiglitz
[1983].
125.See Stiglitz [2001d].
126.This section is based in part on Greenwald,
Kohn, and Stiglitz [1990] and Stiglitz [1992e,
1994a, 1994b].
127.This section is based on Stiglitz [1986a, 1987d,
1988a, 1988e, 1989, 1990b, 1993b, 1995b,
1996a, 1997a, 1997b,1998a,1999b, 2001a, b],
Hoff and Stiglitz [1997, 2000], Stern and
Stiglitz [1997], and Stiglitz and Yusuf [2000] in
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128.See, in particular, the discussion in the World
Bank [1999].
129.There were, of course, several precursors to
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theory. See in particular, the collection of
essays in Shell [1967], and Atkinson and
Stiglitz [1969]. For later work, see, in particu-
lar, Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980a, 1980b, 1981,
1988], Dasgupta, Gilbert, and Stiglitz, [1982],
Stiglitz, [1987e, 1990a].
130.The discussion of this section draws upon
Atkinson and Stiglitz [1976], Stiglitz [1982e,
1987f], and Mirrlees [1971, 1975a], and Brito
et al. [1990, 1991, 1995].
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between individuals of different abilities were
fixed. See Stiglitz [2002] and the papers cited
there.
132.See, e.g. Laffont and Tirole [1993] and Sap-
pington and Stiglitz [1987a].
133.A sector in which government regulation was
of particular importance is banking. We noted
earlier that infonnation problems are at the
heart of financial markets, and it is thus not sur-
prising that market failures be more pervasive,
and the role of the government more important.
See, e.g. Stiglitz [1993a]. Regulatory design
needs to take into account explicitly the limita-
tions in information. See, e.g. Stiglitz [2001c],
Honahan and Stiglitz [2001], Greenwald and
Stiglitz [1999] and Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz [2000].
134.See, for instance, Stiglitz [1998a].
135.See, for instance, Stiglitz [2001e, 2000a], Hus-
sein, Stem, and Stiglitz [2000].
136.See, in particular, Furman and Stiglitz.[1998]
and Stiglitz [1999c].
137.See Stiglitz [2001e].
138.For fuller discussions of these issues, see Hus-
sein, Stem, and Stiglitz [2000] and Stiglitz
[2000a].
139.In addition, much of recent economic theory
has assumed that beliefs are, in some sense,
rational. As noted earlier, there are many
aspects of economic behavior that seem hard to
reconcile with this hypothesis.
140.See, e.g. Stiglitz [1995b, 1998a].
141.See Collier and Gunning [1999], Collier [1998]
and Collier [2000].
142.Stiglitz [1973a, 1974d].
143.For a discussion with references to the litera-
ture, see Stiglitz [2000d, 2000e].
144.There is a large and growing literature on evo-
lutionary economics. See, for instance, May-
nard Smith and Price [1973], Nelson and Win-
ter [1982, 1990], Weibull [1996], Mailath
[1992], Aoki and Feldman [1999], Stiglitz
[1975b, 1992i] and Sah and Stiglitz [1991].
Some of this work emphasized the importance
of capital constraints for evolutionary process-
es.
145.Senator Patrick Moynihan, in his powerful
book Moynihan [1998], shows how secrecy
was abused during the Cold War, in ways
which led to unnecessarily large military
expenditures.
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